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I. INTRODUCTION
Critics have long attacked the Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") on the
grounds that they increased prosecutorial power at the expense of the courts.'
* Associate Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Michael
Browde, Max Minzner, David M. Zlotnick, and John W. Kern for their comments. I also appreciate the research
assistance of Martina Kitzmuller.
1. For a small sampling of the critique, see, e.g., KATE STrTH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 141 (1998) ("[T]he exercise of broad prosecutorial authority
over sentencing within a system that severely limits the sentencing discretion of federal judges means that the
power of prosecutors is not subject to the traditional checks and balances that help prevent abuse of power.");
Frank 0. Bowman, 11, Mr. Madison Meets a Time Machine: The Political Science of Federal Sentencing
Reform, 58 STAN. L. REV. 235, 247 (2005) ("[Tlhe Guidelines system has markedly enhanced the power of
prosecutors to influence the range of available sentencing options before the sentencing hearing ever begins.");
Nancy Gertner, Sentencing Reform When Everyone Behaves Badly, 57 ME. L. REV. 569,577 (2005) ("Executive
power was substantially increased, notably the power of the prosecutor."); Marc L. Miller, Domination &
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1252 (2004) ("The overwhelming and
dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the Commission and the guidelines and mandatory
penalties, is the virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors over federal prosecution and
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Under the Guidelines, prosecutors gained the ability to determine a defendant's
sentence through the charges they filed, the plea bargains they struck, and the
concessions they made. With limited exceptions, the judge was bound to
sentence the defendant within the Guidelines range.2 Now that the Guidelines are
advisory, however, a critical question to ask is how prosecutorial discretion has
been affected under United States v. Booker.3 Has the power that flowed to
prosecutors under the Guidelines returned to the courts? Have we turned back the
clock to the days pre-November 1, 1987, when the Guidelines first took effect?
4
Prognostication is always a risky business, and even more so after the
passage of almost two decades and a recent sea change in the law. As of
November 1, 1987, the Minnesota Twins had just won their first World Series;
Michael Jackson's "Bad" was the number one hit in the United States;6 and the
Berlin Wall still stood.7 Post-Booker commentary runs the gamut of reactions. In
the initial euphoria following Booker, some hailed the decision as a victory for
defendants or the courts.' Others have been more cautious. Some have taken a
wait-and-see approach9 or said that Booker's consequences should not be
sentencing."); Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 29 (2005) ("It has
been a virtual mantra for observers of federal sentencing, both before and after Booker, that the Guidelines
produced a great 'transfer of power' to prosecutors."). But see Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO.
L.J. 1135, 1137 n.6 (2004) (calling "ill-founded" the argument that "it is now mainly the initial selection of
charges by prosecutors that determines the length of sentence," because of internal Department of Justice
charging policies that limit prosecutorial discretion and because "while the Guidelines certainly have somewhat
tied judges' hands, the knots are looser than is commonly believed").
2. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K (2005) (departures).
3. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING: AN ASSESSMENT OF How
WELL THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM IS ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF SENTENCING REFORM xviii
(2004) [hereinafter FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING].
5. See M.L.B.com Baseball's Best, 1987 World Series, Game 7, Twins' First Championship (Oct. 25,
1987), http://minnesota.twins.mlb.com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/baseballs-best/mlb bbgamepage.jsp?story-page=bb
87ws_.gm7_stlmin (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. See The Eighties Club, Top 100 Songs of 1987, http://eightiesclub.tripod.com/id224.htm (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
7. The Berlin Wall fell two years later in November 1989. See Serge Schmemann, Wall Opened at the
Old Center of Berlin, and Mayors Meet; Communists Call Congress; Square is Mobbed, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13,
1989, at Al. The Soviet Union did not begin its dissolution until August 1991. See Bill Keller, Soviet Turmoil:
Soviets' Rush Toward Disunion Spreads; Europe Embracing Baltic Independence; Purge of Military, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1991, at Al.
8. See Joy Anne Boyd, Comment, Power, Policy, and Practice: The Department of Justice's Plea
Bargain Policy as Applied to the Federal Prosecutor's Power Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,
56 ALA. L. REV. 591, 609 (2004) ("The Booker case represents a positive shift in the balance of power between
prosecutors and federal judges as it reinstates much of the judges' discretionary powers that Congress had
steadily eroded in the years following the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984."); Bill Rankin, Justices Strike Down
Sentencing Guidelines, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 13, 2005, at Al ("[C]riminal defense attorneys...
applauded the ruling."); David G. Savage, Judges Freed from Sentencing Rules; the Supreme Court Says the
Guidelines Are No Longer Mandatory, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al (calling Booker a "victory for the
judiciary and a setback for lawmakers who would like to limit judges' sentencing authority").
9. See Gertner, supra note 1, at 583 ("It is too early to understand how these changes will affect the
power of the prosecutor and, in particular, plea bargaining. Predictions in this area are notoriously inaccurate.").
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overstated.' ° One commentator has argued that, under the circumstances, Booker
may prove to be a victory for prosecutors."
This article takes a measured position. On the one hand, Booker has
diminished prosecutorial discretion somewhat. That point, perhaps, is obvious. In
theory, the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and prosecutors have less power
to control sentencing. On the other hand, reports of the demise of prosecutorial
discretion have been greatly exaggerated. Post-Booker, prosecutorial discretion
remains vast and, indeed, for a number of reasons is still likely to be greater than
it was in the pre-Guidelines era. Much has happened since November 1, 1987,
including the passage of mandatory minimum laws and the acculturation of
federal judges to the Guidelines, which, in the aggregate, serve to protect or
enhance prosecutorial power.
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. Overview
In assessing Booker's effect on prosecutorial discretion, it is important to
bear in mind the full scope of that discretion. Justice Jackson, once the Attorney
General of the United States, wrote that "It]he prosecutor has more control over
life, liberty, and reputation than any other person in America.' 2 The federal
prosecutor wields considerable, and often unreviewable, discretion over almost
every aspect of a criminal case, from its beginning to its end.
3
Two reasons are often articulated for the "broad discretion"'' 4 that prosecutors
have in enforcing the federal criminal code. One reason is based on separation of
powers. Prosecutors help the President "discharge his constitutional respon-
10. See Bowman, supra note 1, at 257 ("The only difference between pre- and post-Booker Guidelines is
that judges now have some as-yet-undefined amount of additional discretion to vary from the Guidelines, and
the government has experienced a very modest (and probably short-lived) reduction in control over sentencing
outcomes."); James G. Carr, Some Thoughts on Sentencing Post-Booker, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 295, 295 (2005)
("[P]rosecutorial influence over sentencing outcomes, which the Guideline system in real-world practice had
greatly enhanced, remains substantial."); Mark Osler, This Changes Everything: A Call for a Directive, Goal-
Oriented Principle to Guide the Exercise of Discretion by Federal Prosecutors, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 625, 626
(2005) ("Even given these sudden shifts, federal prosecutors today still wield tremendous discretion, even if it
less than that accorded to judges (for the moment)."); Kevin R. Reitz, The Enforceability of Sentencing
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 155, 173 (2005) ("In fact, the pre-Booker system was never as mandatory as
sometimes portrayed, and the new characterization of the system as advisory is a shibboleth.").
11. See Margareth Etienne, Into the Briar Patch?: Power Shifts Between Prosecution and Defense After
United States v. Booker, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 741, 742 (2005) ("Although only time will reveal the true winners
and losers of the Booker decision, there is good reason to believe that the prosecution has won this round and
that criminal defendants will have to seek favorable sentencing changes elsewhere.").
12. Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940).
13. Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 Wisc. L. REV. 837, 837-38
(2004) ("Few decisions prosecutors make are subject to legal restraints or judicial review."). For a discussion of
the history of scholarship on prosecutorial discretion, see id. at 837 n. 1.
14. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607
(1985).
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sibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.""'.5 "By the constitution
of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience."' 6
The second reason is related to the first: as a matter of institutional
competency, "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial
review."' 7 Courts would have difficulty assessing the many factors inherent in
prosecutorial decision making, including "the strength of the case, the
prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities,
and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan . .. .""
Excessive judicial oversight of prosecutors might also "chill law enforcement"
and "undermine prosecutorial effectiveness."' 9
When a matter is referred to the prosecutor, she must first decide if it should
be investigated. If the prosecutor chooses to decline prosecution, that declination
is unreviewable. 20 A prosecutor deciding to pursue the matter can often direct the
investigation. Who should law enforcement agents interview? Which leads
should be pursued? Should places be searched and evidence seized? If so, which
places and what evidence? Is a warrant necessary, or is there an applicable
exception to the warrant requirement? Would electronic surveillance be helpful?
If so, can a warrant be obtained either under Title 11121 or under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act?2 What forensic analysis needs to be done?
At some point, the prosecutor may proceed to the grand jury. Absent a
waiver by the defendant, the grand jury must indict all felony cases.23 The
prosecutor can determine what evidence the grand jury will hear and which
witnesses should be subpoenaed to the grand jury. Once a witness is brought to
the grand jury, counsel is excluded; nor is a judge present.24 The prosecutor can
also ask the grand jury to issue subpoenas to compel the production of certain
15. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see also James Vorenberg, Decent
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1546-55 (1981) (discussing justifications for
prosecutorial discretion).
16. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803).
17. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464.
21. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518 (West 2000).
22. 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1811 (West 2003 & Supp. 2005).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... ).
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)(1) (allowing only "attorneys for the government, the witness being questioned,
interpreters when needed, and a court reporter or an operator of a recording device" to be present).
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types of evidence, from documents to physical evidence. 5 Thus, the prosecutor
guides the grand jury's broad investigative powers.26
If charges are warranted, the prosecutor now has the discretion to select the
charges that the grand jury will be asked to consider. "In the ordinary case, 'so
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed
an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what
charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in [her]
discretion.' 27 As a practical matter, she now has more choice than ever before in
the history of the United States. The past few decades have witnessed a surge in
the number of federal crimes enacted by Congress.28 Many crimes carry tough
mandatory minimum sentences. This is particularly true with respect to certain
narcotics and firearms offenses 9
Assuming the grand jury returns an indictment, the prosecutor now has the
discretion to move for the defendant's pretrial detention if the defendant poses a
danger to the community or a flight risk.30 Even if the defendant is not detained
pretrial, the prosecutor can request that certain conditions of release be imposed.3'
If the prosecutor does not object to the conditions proposed by the defendant or
Pretrial Services, the court may be more inclined to adopt those conditions.
After the arraignment, the defense has the opportunity to file motions that
challenge different aspects of the government's case.3" These motions can cover a
myriad of theories, from motions to suppress evidence on the grounds that the
evidence was taken in violation of the laws of the United States,33 to motions to
sever counts or defendants 3 and motions to dismiss charges on the basis of
vindictive prosecution or unfair pretrial publicity.35 Whatever the motion, the
prosecutor can choose to oppose or not oppose the motion. A decision by the
prosecutor not to oppose the motion will often be dispositive; the court will
usually grant the motion.
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1).
26. United States v. R. Enter. Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991) ('The function of the grand jury is to
inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has
satisfied itself that none has occurred.").
27. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978)).
28. There are more than 3000 federal crimes. Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact
on the Federal Courts, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SCi. 39,40-44 (1996). Over forty percent of all federal
crimes have been enacted since 1970. ABA TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7 (1998).
29. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 & West Supp. 2005) (mandatory minimum penalties for
drug offenses); 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c) (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (mandatory minimum penalties for
firearm offense).
30. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d)(2) (West 2000).
31. Id. § 3142(c) (enumerating possible conditions on release).
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) (listing motions that must be filed pretrial).
33. Id. at 12(b)(3).
34. Id. at 12(b)(3)(D), 14.
35. Id. at 12(b)(3)(D).
2006 / Prosecutorial Discretion in the Post-Booker World
If the parties enter into plea negotiations, the prosecutor wields the discretion
to control the terms of an offer.36 The offer may minimally discount the charges
reflected in the indictment, or the offer may be far more generous. The
prosecutor also has the power to determine if she wishes to work with a potential
cooperating defendant. Cooperation may be particularly important for defendants
otherwise facing lengthy prison sentences, especially a mandatory minimum
penalty under the drug laws.37 Once the cooperation is complete, the prosecutor
has the power to inform the court of the defendant's helpfulness. Obviously, an
enthusiastic letter from the prosecutor may prove decisive to a sentencing judge.
If the case goes to trial, the prosecutor develops a theory of her case and the
strategy for implementing it. She decides which witnesses to call and what
evidence to present; she alone determines what the opening statement will be, as
well as the closing argument and rebuttal. Issues will arise during trial that also
allow for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. The defense may proffer
evidence or ask that certain jury instructions be given. Again, if the prosecutor
does not object to the defense request, invariably the request will be granted.
Prosecutorial discretion arises again if the jury convicts the defendant. If the
defendant was released pre-trial, the prosecutor may now move for his
detention.38 At sentencing, the prosecutor may ask that a particular sentence be
imposed. As part of that allocution, she may oppose the defendant's attempt to
obtain a more lenient sentence and argue for a more severe sentence based upon
the circumstances of the case.
Post-sentencing, the prosecutor still retains a considerable amount of
discretion. Among other things, the prosecutor has the discretion to decide
whether or not to appeal the sentence imposed by the court.39 She may also file a
Rule 35 motion to reduce the sentence if the defendant cooperates post-
sentencing and provides substantial assistance.40 While the Bureau of Prisons
bears ultimate responsibility for the placement of prisoners, the prosecutor may
contact the Bureau to share her views on where the defendant should be
incarcerated. The prosecutor's views will be solicited at some later date if the
36. Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional
Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 214 (2005) ("Through prosecutorial discretion,
the executive enjoys vast discretion in the enforcement of substantive criminal laws. The prosecution has the
sole authority and discretion to initiate criminal proceedings. Prosecutorial discretion bestows prosecutors with
the power to decide whom to charge and what to charge them with, thus investing these agents of the executive
with the power to decide whether to even subject a would-be defendant to a criminal jury. Plea bargaining gives
the executive branch a rich method of avoiding juries as well. At trial, prosecutors decide what evidence to
present, how to present it, and what story it will be used to instantiate.") (footnote omitted).
37. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (providing the court with "authority to
impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense").
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (2000).
39. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(b) (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (allowing government to appeal sentence).
40. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). In 2000, 1453 individuals received a Rule 35 sentence reduction. FIFTEEN
YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 106.
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defendant seeks executive clemency, whether a pardon or commutation of
sentence.4 ' "The United States Attorney may support, oppose, or take no position
on a pardon request. 42
B. Under the Guidelines Pre-Booker
Since the Guidelines took effect, there has been a veritable outpouring of
scholarship on the ways in which they have increased prosecutorial discretion.4 3 It
is widely accepted that under the Guidelines sentencing power flowed from
judges to prosecutors. ' In the indeterminate pre-Guidelines era, judges had
virtually unreviewable discretion in imposing a sentence that fell within the
limits provided by the statute of conviction. 4  A primary purpose of the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984," which led to the creation of the Guidelines,
was to constrain judicial discretion, and, in particular, to eliminate "unwarranted
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been
found guilty of similar criminal conduct ....
Thus, the Guidelines created a determinate sentencing regime. It would be
incorrect to say that judges had no discretion under the Guidelines. 8 In fact, they
41. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-2.111 available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/pardon/petitions.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("The United States Attorney can contribute
significantly to the clemency process by providing factual information and perspectives about the offense of
conviction that may not be reflected in the presentence or background investigation reports or other sources.").
42. Id.
43. See Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 29 ("It has been a virtual mantra for observers of federal
sentencing, both before and after Booker, that the Guidelines produced a great 'transfer of power' to
prosecutors. This is because prosecutors have free rein over which charges to bring, and judges are considerably
circumscribed in their choice of sentences under fairly rigid Guidelines rules."); Miller, supra note 1, at 1252
("The overwhelming and dominant fact of the federal sentencing system, beyond the Commission and the
guidelines and mandatory penalties, is the virtually absolute power the system has given prosecutors over
federal prosecution and sentencing.").
44. See supra notes 1, 43.
45. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996) ("Before the Guidelines system, a federal
criminal sentence within the statutory limits was, for all practical purposes, not reviewable on appeal."); United
States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) ("[A] sentence imposed by a federal district judge, if within
statutory limits, is generally not subject to review.").
46. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. !1, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
47. 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(b)(l)(B) (West 1993 & West Supp. 2006); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (noting
that perception of unjustified sentencing disparities led Congress to create the United States Sentencing
Commission and to charge with it developing a comprehensive set of sentencing guidelines); FIFTEEN YEARS
OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 11 ("The 'first and foremost' goal of sentencing reform is
avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparity."); Bowman, supra note 1, at 243-44 ("The principal critique of the
pre-Guidelines federal sentencing system was that it concentrated too much power in the hands of individual
sentencing judges, power that was unconstrained either by a priori legislative rules or even by post hoc appellate
review.") (citation omitted).
48. Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 ("The Act did not eliminate all of the district court's discretion, however.");
Bowman, supra note I, at 245 (noting that judges "retained substantial theoretical sentencing discretion through
the unconstrained power to sentence within ranges, through the departure power to impose sentences outside of
ranges, and through the hidden but very real de facto discretionary authority that they were given through the
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retained some discretion, but it was limited. Based on a preponderance of the
evidence standard,49 they were often called upon to make factual findings that
could increase or decrease a sentence. 0 After calculating the defendant's offense
level and criminal history score, they were required to impose a sentence within
the relevant sentencing range.5' This range varied by about twenty-five percent
from the top of the range to its bottom.52 In limited circumstances, judges could
also make departures, whether upward or downward, from the Guidelines range."
In contrast to judges, who lost the discretion they had exercised in an
indeterminate sentencing regime, prosecutors gained power under the
Guidelines.4 First, the Guidelines amplified the power prosecutors have always
had in making charging decisions. While prosecutors have long exercised
charging discretion, in the pre-Guidelines era, the judge, not the prosecutor,
eventually decided what the sentence would be in the event of conviction. Under
the Guidelines, however, the prosecutor's charging decision was tied to a specific
sentencing range from which the judge had circumscribed discretion to depart."
Second, the Guidelines adopted principles of "real offense" sentencing,56 and
this too enhanced prosecutorial power.57 Relevant conduct rules require the
district court to consider the actual offense conduct, including facts that may not
have been specified in the indictment or established as elements of the charged
power to find sentencing facts"); Reitz, supra note 10, at 173 ("[T]he pre-Booker system was never as
mandatory as sometimes portrayed ....").
49. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A1.3, cmt. (2005); United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148,
156 (1997) (per curiam).
50. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.1 (2005) (listing application instructions for
Guidelines).
51. Id. § I1B1.1(g).
52. Id. § 5A (sentencing table).
53. Id. §§ 4AI.3, 5K; Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 ("Congress allows district courts to depart from the
applicable Guideline range if 'the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described."').
54. See supra notes 1,43.
55. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 1, at 247 (noting importance of charging decisions under the
Guidelines); Bowman, supra note 1, at 247-48 ("[T]he Guidelines system has markedly enhanced the power of
prosecutors to influence the range of available sentencing options before the sentencing hearing ever begins.");
Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 29 ("[Plrosecutors have free rein over which charges to bring, and judges
are considerably circumscribed in their choice of sentences under fairly rigid Guidelines rules.").
56. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that the Guidelines are "a
significantly real offense, as opposed to charge offense, sentencing system"); see also U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § IA 1.1, cmt., n. 1 (2005) (The Guidelines have "a number of real elements.").
57. Margareth Etienne, Parity, Disparity, and Adversariality: First Principles of Sentencing, 58 STAN.
L. REV. 309, 316 (2005) ("A federal prosecutor need only possess enough reliable, admissible evidence to
convict the defendant of something beyond a reasonable doubt; once the conviction is obtained, the prosecution
can use virtually any information it possesses in order to obtain the desired sentence."); William J. Powell &
Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the
Hen House?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 373, 383-89 (1995) (noting increase in prosecutorial discretion in part because
of standard of proof at sentencing and relevant conduct rules).
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offense.' 8 In narcotics cases, for example, the court must aggregate all drugs
trafficked by the defendant that were "part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."5 9 "This means, for
example, that a defendant convicted of selling drugs to an undercover officer on
one occasion is sentenced. . . for the amount of drugs involved in all the drug
trafficking known to the court that was part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as that one sale." 6 Even conduct for which the
defendant had been acquitted could be considered, as long as it was established
by a preponderance of the evidence.6' While courts have long had this
discretion, under the Guidelines once the judge makes the requisite findings she
must take them into account at sentencing.63 Prosecutors influence this process
through the evidence they introduce as relevant conduct.
Third, prosecutors also hold the key to sentences below what might
otherwise be the applicable Guidelines range. Through plea bargaining they can
agree to an offense of conviction that carries a statutory maximum below the
defendant's Guidelines exposure; they can agree not to seek aggravating factors
that would increase a defendant's punishment; or they can stipulate to mitigating
factors that, in effect, reduce the potential sentence.64 Similarly, prosecutors
control the filing of substantial assistance motions, which allow the court to
depart downward from the guideline range.65 They also control the ability of the
court to grant an additional reduction of one offense level under section 3E 1.1 (b)
for timely acceptance of responsibility.66
Fourth, in some cases, the sheer complexity of the Guidelines arguably adds
to prosecutorial power.67 The latest Guidelines Manual is more than 600 pages
long and has been amended 680 times as of November 1, 2005;68 it contains aplethora of highly technical rules. Although the Probation Office prepares the
58. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 26.
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2).
60. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 26.
61. United States v. Watt, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (2005).
62. Id. at 151-52.
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § lB 1.3.
64. Frank 0. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1338-39 (2005).
65. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1; FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b)(4); see also Bowman,
supra note 64, at 1337 ("[Bly giving prosecutors a monopoly on the power to make substantial assistance
motions, the guidelines made prosecutors the gatekeepers of downward departures for cooperation.").
66. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(b); Bowman, supra note 64, at 1338.
67. Bowman, supra note 1, at 251 ("The combination of complexity, rigidity, and severity conferred
tremendous power on prosecutors at the district level."); Etienne, supra note 57, at 320 ("Unnecessary
complexity will almost always benefit the repeat player in federal court."); Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at
29 ("Scholars widely perceive the power of prosecutors to have increased compared to the pre-Guidelines
world, in part because the complexity and rigidity of the system can be used like a control panel by experienced
prosecutors to produce the outcomes they desire.").
68. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. C (2005).
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presentence report,69 and the judge decides sentencing issues,7" neither is involved
in plea negotiations,7' when knowledge of the Guidelines is at a premium. A
defense lawyer who seldom practices in federal court may be at a disadvantage in
negotiating a plea agreement or litigating sentencing issues against an
experienced federal prosecutor, who will be better equipped to navigate the
intricacies of the Guidelines.
To a modest extent, self-imposed Department of Justice policies may cabin
prosecutorial discretion in making charging decisions and negotiating plea
agreements.73 Those internal policies began with Attorney General Richard
Thornburgh, and continued with Attorney General Janet Reno, and Attorney
General John Ashcroft.74 The Ashcroft Memorandum is the most important of the
recent statements of Justice Department policy. 75 Like its predecessors, it
attempts to create national uniformity in charging decisions and plea bargaining.
To avoid unwarranted disparities, the Ashcroft Memorandum requires that
"federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable
offense or offenses that are supported by the facts of the case . .. ,,76
Nevertheless, there are significant exceptions to the policy, including "cases
where post-indictment circumstances cause a prosecutor to determine in good
faith that the most serious offense is not readily provable, because of a change in
the evidence or some other justifiable reason . . . .7 Prosecutors may also
bargain away readily provable charges in "other exceptional circumstances,"
including circumstances that take into account an office's workload and
78
resources.
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
70. Id. at 32(i).
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 I(c)(1) (barring court from participating in plea negotiations).
72. Etienne, supra note 57, at 320-21.
73. Commentators differ on the extent to which those policies constrain prosecutorial discretion.
Compare Litman, supra note 1, at 1137-38 n.6 ("The policy of charging the most serious readily provable
offense remains in effect, with some modifications, and is taken seriously in most federal districts."), with
Osler, supra note 10, at 634-35 (calling it "fair to say that the Ashcroft Memorandum limits discretion," but
noting exceptions to the policy and arguing that it fails to provide "principled, goal-oriented, and consistent
guidance").
74. For a history of the policies, see Amie N. Ely, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion as an Ethical
Necessity: The Ashcroft Memorandum's Curtailment of the Prosecutor's Duty to "Seek Justice, " 90 CORNELL
L. REV. 237,252-63 (2004); Boyd, supra note 8, at 597-99.
75. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors Regarding
Department Policy Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22,
2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/20O3/September/03-ag-516.htm (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review); see also Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Att'y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors
Regarding Department Policies and Procedures Concerning Sentencing (Jan. 28, 2005), available at
http://sentencing.typepad.comsentencing-aw-and-policy/files/dagjan_28-comey-memo _on booker.pdf
[hereinafter Ashcroft Memorandum] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (giving post-Booker guidance to
federal prosecutors that reaffirms the Ashcroft Memorandum).
76. Ashcroft Memorandum, supra note 75, at 2.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id at 4-5.
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C. And Then There Was Booker
In hindsight, United States v. Booker7 9 has an air of inevitability about it; the
denouement of a long march of cases that began with Jones v. United States,"
and continued with Apprendi v. New Jersey," Ring v. Arizona s8 and Blakely v.
Washington." In Booker, a five to four majority of the Supreme Court held that
the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they required a district
judge to impose an enhanced sentence based on various factual findings made by
the judge, not the jury. 4 "Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is
necessary to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'85
That being said, in a remarkable turnabout, a second five to four majority of
the Court in Booker then issued a remedial opinion that preserved the Guidelines
86by making them advisory . The Court addressed the Sixth Amendment infirmity
by using severability analysis to excise the statutory provisions that made the
Guidelines mandatory.87 The upshot of Booker is that a district court is no longer
required to impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range. The court
must still consider the Guidelines, including the applicable sentencing range, but
may "tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns" in the Sentencing
Reform Act.88 On appeal, sentences must be reviewed for "unreasonableness." '8 9
III. LIMITS ON BOOKER
To some extent, Booker reduces prosecutorial power that flowed from the
Guidelines. But the extent of that diminution should not be overstated. Despite
the fact that the Guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory, there are
significant limits on Booker's reach with respect to prosecutorial discretion.
Those limits stem from several different factors: (1) the range of prosecutorial
discretion; (2) the proliferation and importance of mandatory minimum statutes;
79. 540 U.S. 220 (2005).
80. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
81. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
82. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
83. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
84. 543 U.S. at 232 (Stevens, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). Justice Stevens was joined
by Justices Souter, Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg.
85. Id. at 244.
86. Id. at 245 (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court in part). Justice Breyer was joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg. Justice Ginsburg was the swing vote for both
majorities of the Court.
87. Id. at 245, 258-65.
88. Id. at 245-46.
89. Id. at 260-65.
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(3) the likely response of the courts to Booker; and (4) an application of bargain
theory.
A. Range of Prosecutorial Discretion
At the outset it is important to recognize that Booker only affected the
discretion prosecutors acquired under the Guidelines. This is only a small part of
the panoply of powers prosecutors possess in modem times.9° Then Attorney
General Robert Jackson was speaking in a pre-Guidelines world when he told a
conference of United States Attorneys that "[i]t would probably be within the
range of that exaggeration permitted in Washington to say that assembled in this
room is one of the most powerful peace-time forces known to our country."9' A
prosecutor's discretion was "tremendous:"
He can have citizens investigated and, if he is that kind of person, he can
have this done to the tune of public statements and veiled or unveiled
intimations. Or the prosecutor may choose a more subtle course and
simply have a citizen's friends interviewed. The prosecutor can order
arrests, present cases to the grand jury in secret session, and on the basis
of his one-sided presentation of the facts, can cause the citizen to be
indicted and held for trial. He may dismiss the case before trial, in which
case the defense never has a chance to be heard. Or he may go on with a
public trial. If he obtains a conviction, the prosecutor can still make
recommendations as to sentence, as to whether the prisoner should get
probation or a suspended sentence, and after he is put away, as to
whether he is a fit subject for parole.92
With the exception of parole, which the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
abolished, 93 Jackson's words are as true today as they were in 1940.
Moreover, while Booker reduced the power of prosecutors to determine the
parameters of a defendant's sentence, it hardly eliminated that power.
Prosecutors still possess the power to select charges for indictment. Even without
the Guidelines, prosecutors can files charges that carry mandatory-minimum
penalties. Similarly, prosecutors retain the power to grant substantial assistance
motions and the power to introduce evidence at sentencing to argue that a
defendant's relevant conduct ought to result in an enhanced sentence.
Of course, prosecutors also retain their plea bargaining power. Among other
things, they can make a non-binding "recommend[ation], or agree not to oppose
90. Osler, supra note 10, at 626 ("Though they may not have the same ability post-Booker to leverage
mandatoiy Sentencing Guidelines, prosecutors retain the power to guide investigations, accept or decline cases,
draft charges, press for convictions through plea negotiation, and seek specific sentences.").
91. Jackson, supra note 12, at 3.
92. Id.
93. Bowman, supra note 64, at 1323.
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the defendant's request, that a particular sentence[,] or sentencing range is
appropriate or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy
statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply." 94 Beyond that, under
Rule 11 (c)(1)(C) prosecutors can offer a plea to a binding sentence or sentencing
range and to the applicability or non-applicability of sentencing factors. The
sentencing court may accept or reject the plea agreement. If the court accepts the
agreement, however, it cannot modify its terms9
B. Mandatory Minimum Sentences
That the Guidelines are now advisory under Booker fails to take into account
the recent proliferation of federal criminal statutes that impose mandatory
minimum penalties. Mandatory minimum statutes are not a recent innovation in
American law; the earliest such statutes date from the Founding.96 Beginning in
the mid-1980s, as part of the "war on drugs," Congress began to pass mandatory
minimum laws that targeted drug trafficking and violent crime .97 The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 198698 provided tough penalties for narcotics offenses triggered by
the weight and type of drugs involved. Five grams of crack cocaine resulted in a
mandatory minimum sentence of five years incarceration;99 fifty grams (a little
less than two ounces) resulted in a ten year sentence.' °° Congress has also passed
laws that impose mandatory minimum penalties for using, carrying, or possessing
a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking
offense,'"' a mandatory life sentence for violent repeat offenders,' 2 and
mandatory minimum penalties for sex offenders.'0 3 There are over 100 mandatory
minimum penalties in the federal criminal code. ' °H
94. FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)(1)(B).
95. Id. 1 I(c)(1)(C) ("[S]uch a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea
agreement.").
96. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6-7 (1991) [hereinafter MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES]; George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The
Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 212 (2004) (describing early mandatory
minimum laws that applied to slave trading, fraud on the Bank of the United States, theft of mail, and crime in
the District of Columbia).
97. MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 96, at 9.
98. 21 U.S.C.A. § 841 (West 1999 & West Supp. 2005).
99. Id. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii).
100. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (imposing a five-year sentence for using
or carrying the firearm; seven years for brandishing the firearm; and ten years for discharging the firearm).
102. Id. § 3559(c)(1) (West 2000).
103. Id. § 2251 (West 2000 & West Supp. 2005) (imposing a fifteen-year sentence for first-time
offender who sexually exploits children).
104. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 3; MANDATORY MINIMUM
PENALTIES, supra note 96, at 11.
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For our purposes, the most important mandatory minimum laws on which to
focus involve narcotics. For over three decades, drug offenses have constituted
the largest portion of the federal criminal docket.' 5 In recent years, they have
accounted for around forty percent of all federal convictions.'06 Only a small
percentage of the cases involve simple possession of drugs; most involve drug
trafficking.' 7 This is important because the majority of drug trafficking offenses
involve quantities of drugs sufficient to trigger mandatory minimum sentences.
In fiscal year 2003, almost sixty percent of all drug offenders were convicted
under laws with a mandatory minimum penalty.0 8 This is not surprising. United
States Attorneys Offices typically do not prosecute small drug cases. In cases
involving limited quantities of drugs, federal prosecutors usually defer to state
prosecution.
As commentators and courts alike have noted, the mandatory minimum drug
laws give great power-or, to put it more bluntly, a hammer-to prosecutors. '°9
First, as Justice Breyer has observed, mandatory minimum laws "transfer
105. FIFrEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 47; U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION,
ANNUAL REPORT 2003, 38 (2004) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2003].
106. See ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 105, at 38; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SELECTED 2004
SOURCEBOOK TABLES tbl.3 (2005), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/selected_2004.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review); Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 11 (discussing rise in federal drug
prosecutions from the 1970s to the present).
107. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SELECTED 2004 SOURCEBOOK TABLES tbl.3. In fiscal year 2004, there
were 23,572 convictions for trafficking; 346 convictions for use of a communication facility; and 1296
convictions for simple possession. Id.
108. ANNUAL REPORT 2003, supra note 105, at 39.
109. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 570-71 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring); MANDATORY
MINIMUM PENALTIES, supra note 96, at 31 ("Mandatory minimums employ a structure that allows a shifting of
discretion and control over the implementation of sentencing policies from courts to prosecutors. The manner in
which prosecutorial discretion is exercised in charge selection, filing of informations to trigger mandatory
enhancements based on prior convictions, plea bargaining, and the making of motions for sentence reduction
based on a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation of other crimes, determine the extent and
consistency with which statutory minimum sentences are actually applied."); AM. BAR ASS'N J. KENNEDY
COMM'N, REPORTS WITH RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 26-27 (2004) ("[Mandatory
minimums] tend to shift sentencing discretion away from courts to prosecutors."); Albert W. Alschuler,
Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REv. 85, 114-15 (2005)
(noting that mandatory-minimum sentences plus the Guidelines have increased prosecutorial power and that
prosecutors control whether mandatory minimum sentences will be imposed); Ronald F. Wright, Trial
Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 153 (2005)
("Mandatory minimum sentence laws exert a powerful pull on plea negotiations, because a prosecutor's
promise not to file (or to dismiss) charges that carry a mandatory minimum penalty can create enormous gaps in
the sentence imposed and enormous incentives to plead guilty."); John S. Martin, Jr., Why Mandatory
Minimums Make No Sense, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 311, 314 (2004) ("Since the power to
determine the charge of conviction rests exclusively with the prosecution for the eighty-five percent of the cases
that do not proceed to trial, mandatory minimums transfer sentencing power from the court to the
prosecution."); Ian Weinstein, Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How Mandatory
Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 87, 88 (2003)
("[T]he vast increase in prosecutorial power to control narcotics sentences is at the core of the problems with
federal narcotics sentencing. The profusion of new narcotics and gun proscriptions, almost all of which carry
mandatory minimum prison sentences, transformed the traditional prosecutorial power to charge into the
contemporary prosecutorial power to determine the length of the sentence the defendant will serve.").
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 37
sentencing power to prosecutors, who can determine sentences through the
charges they decide to bring.""... Second, they "generally deny the judge the legal
power to depart downward, no matter how unusual the special circumstances that
call for leniency."' There are few ways to avoid a mandatory minimum drug
sentence. One is to qualify for the "safety-valve" provision, which is intended to
apply to nonviolent low-level offenders with a minimal criminal history.
' 2
Another is to provide "substantial assistance" to the government."3 Here, the
prosecutor holds the cards, deciding whether to work with potential cooperators
and whether, at the end of the day, a cooperator should receive a substantial
assistance motion."4 Even if she files the motion, she controls the content of the
motion, to which the sentencing court must give "[s]ubstantial weight.""' 5 In
general, absent such a motion, the court cannot depart for substantial
• 116
assistance.
In short, nothing about Booker undermines the current mandatory minimum
regime that applies to a substantial portion of all federal prosecutions and to the
bulk of federal drug cases.' After all, the mandatory minimum laws trump the
Guidelines, so that a Guideline sentence cannot be "less than any statutorily
required minimum sentence.""' Prosecutors continue to possess the charging
discretion that determines if a defendant will be subjected to a mandatory
minimum penalty. They also control the filing of substantial assistance motions
and Rule 35(b) motions for sentence reduction.' 9
110. Harris, 536 U.S. at 571 (Breyer, J., concurring). In narcotics cases, this includes the filing of an
information that informs the court of a defendant's prior record. 21 U.S.C.A. § 851 (West 1999). The
information can result in a doubling of the mandatory minimum sentence or even mandatory life imprisonment.
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & West Supp. 2005).
111. Harris, 536 U.S. at 570 (Breyer, J., concurring).
112. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(f) (West 2000).
113. Id. § 3553(e); 28 U.S.C.A. § 994(n) (West 1993); FED. R. CRiM. P. 35(b)(4) (allowing post-
sentencing substantial assistance).
114. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5KI.1 (2005).
115. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 cmt. n.3 (2005).
116. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005) (stating that substantial assistance departure is
contingent "[u]pon motion of the government"); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5KI.1 (2005).
District courts have limited power to review the government's decision not to file such a motion. They may
only review the refusal for "an unconstitutional motive." Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992).
117. See FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at xvi ("Statutory minimum
penalties are invoked unevenly and introduce disproportionality and disparity when they prevent the guidelines
from individualizing sentences."); Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender
Characteristics in Modem Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 290 (2005) ("[B]efore Booker, when the
Guidelines operated as mandatory sentencing rules, and even after Booker in cases involving mandatory
minimum sentencing provisions, federal sentencing judges have had relatively little opportunity to 'consider
every convicted person as an individual."').
118. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.L(c)(2) (2005).
119. One issue worth watching is whether Booker will result in fewer defendants cooperating with the
government. The Attorney General has voiced that concern. Alberto Gonzales, Prepared Remarks of Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales, Sentencing Guidelines Speech (June 21, 2005), available at http://www.usdoj.
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C. Response of the Courts
The response of lower courts to Booker may serve as another potential limit
on its reach. To the extent that district courts continue to follow the Guidelines,
prosecutorial discretion remains little diminished by Booker. For a number of
reasons, it appears likely that, in most cases, courts will continue to impose
sentences within the relevant Guidelines range. First, Booker itself requires trial
courts to consider the Guidelines, and post-Booker case law has begun to
interpret the "reasonableness" standard of review in a manner that is deferential
to Guidelines sentences. Second, most federal judges have been appointed post-
November 1, 1987, and are thus acculturated to using the Guidelines, which have
become their frame of reference in imposing sentence. Third, federal judges are
undoubtedly aware of the post-Booker backlash that has occurred and the clamor
for legislative reform. They are apt to use their discretion carefully so as to avoid
giving the impression of judicial overreaching. Post-Booker statistics compiled
by the United States Sentencing Commission reveal that judges are, in fact,
following the Guidelines in the majority of cases, though at the low end of the
historical compliance rate. Finally, an examination of states with voluntary
guidelines shows that the compliance rate can be high.
1. Reasonableness Standard of Review
One constraint on sentencing judges comes from Booker itself. Under
Booker, "district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult
gov/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also
Bowman, supra note 1, at 257 n.90 (noting the Justice Department's concern over "the de facto repeal of the
government's monopoly on substantial assistance motions"); David B. Fein & Joshua Ratner, Sentencing Post-
Booker From a Defense Perspective, N.Y. L.J., May, 19 2005 at 4 (speculating that "a defendant may not need
a 5KI motion to obtain a sentence below the guidelines range"); Alan Ellis & James H. Feldman, Representing
White Collar Clients in a Post-Booker World, CHAMPION 12, 14 (Sept./Oct. 2005), available at http://
sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-andpolicy/fles/white-collar-from-ellisfeldman.pdf (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (expressing hope that "[a] court may now impose a below-the-guidelines sentence
based on a defendant's cooperation even without a government motion"). Those concerns are unwarranted in
drug cases involving mandatory minimum penalties. The relevant statute is clear that sentences below a
mandatory minimum must still be triggered by a government substantial assistance motion. 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). Post-Booker, one court has also held that in calculating the advisory
Guidelines range, unless the government files a substantial assistance motion, any assistance the defendant
provides is not a permissible basis for a downward departure. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1182
(1 th Cir. 2005). While it is too early to tell, post-Booker statistics show that judges granted 6796 substantial
assistance departure motions in 2005 (14.6% of all post-Booker sentences). U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT 1 (Dec. 2005) [hereinafter SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT],
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker 120105.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
Clearly, thousands of defendants continue to cooperate with the government. Moreover, it might be difficult to
attribute any drop in cooperation to Booker alone. In 1989, substantial assistance departures occurred in only
3.5% of the cases. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
Figure G (1997). That percentage increased each year until it peaked at 19.7% in 1995. Id. Since then it has
fallen steadily to reach the present rate. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS Figure G (2001); SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra, at 7.
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those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing."'20 The court may
then "tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns."'' 2' The sentence is
reviewed for "unreasonableness" on appeal. 22 As a result, Booker ensures that the
Guidelines continue to have relevance. District courts cannot simply ignore them
in imposing sentence. Indeed, the United States Sentencing Commission has
opined that "the sentencing court must consider the guidelines and that such
consideration necessarily requires the sentencing court to calculate the guideline
sentencing range."'' 23 The Courts of Appeals have agreed. 124 Indeed, improper
calculation of the Guidelines range in and of itself results in error that may
require the sentence to be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.,
25
More than that, the key question now becomes how much weight the
Guidelines should be given in assessing the reasonableness of a sentence. The
United States Sentencing Commission has taken the position that the sentencing
court must give "substantial weight to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in
determining the appropriate sentence to impose.' 26  Two conflicting
interpretations have emerged from the Courts of Appeals. Several Circuits have
held that a sentence within the relevant Guidelines range is entitled to a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. 27 Other Circuits have declined to
120. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005) (Breyer, J., delivering the opinion of the Court
in part).
121. Id. at 245-46. Those statutory concerns are articulated in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a). Id. Judges are
required to consider Sentencing Commission policy statements, avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and
provide restitution to victims. Id. at 259-60. They must impose sentences that "reflect the seriousness of the
offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public,
and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training and medical care." Id. at
260.
122. Id. at 260-61.
123. Prepared Testimony of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, H. Comm. on the Judiciary at 2 (Feb. 10, 2005),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/bookertestimony.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
124. See United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (2005) ("[The] consultation requirement, at a
minimum, obliges the district court to calculate correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.");
United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he sentencing court must first determine the
appropriate guidelines sentencing range, since that range does remain an important factor to be considered in
imposition of a sentence."); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) ("This duty to 'consider'
the Guidelines will ordinarily require the sentencing judge to determine the applicable Guidelines range even
though the judge is not required to sentence within that range."); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546
(4th Cir. 2005) ("Consistent with the remedial scheme set forth in Booker, a district court shall first calculate
(after making the appropriate findings of fact) the range prescribed by the guidelines."); United States v.
Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 113 (2d Cir. 2005) ("the sentencing judge must consider the Guidelines").
125. See United States v. Price, 409 F.3d 436, 443 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[Wlhen the District Court purports
to apply the Guidelines it must do so without error."); Crawford, 407 F.3d at 1179 ("In other words, as was the
case before Booker, the district court must calculate the Guidelines range accurately."); United States v.
Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1020 (8th Cir. 2005) (remanding for resentencing without reaching reasonableness
inquiry if defendant "sentenced as a result of an incorrect application of the guidelines"); Mares, 402 F.3d at
519 (noting importance of Guidelines range being "properly calculated" for reasonableness review).
126. Prepared Testimony of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, supra note 123, at 4.
127. See, e.g., United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Kristl,
437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 436 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2006), petition for
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adopt such a presumption.' 28 In support of the latter position, the Second Circuit
has explained, "[b]ecause 'reasonableness' is inherently a concept of flexible
meaning, generally lacking precise boundaries, we decline to fashion any per se
rules as to the reasonableness of every sentence within an applicable guideline or
the unreasonableness of every sentence outside an applicable guideline."'
' 29
Regardless of the precise standard articulated by the courts, one thing is
clear: Booker has not resulted in district courts being given carte blanche at
sentencing. 13 We have not returned to the days of indeterminate sentencing. In a
number of cases, district courts that significantly varied from the Guidelines have
been reversed under the reasonableness inquiry. 3 ' It is also clear that if a district
cert. filed (U.S. July 11, 2006) (No. 06-5275); United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 551, 554 (5th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180, 1185 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Jimenez-
Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 2006) (en banc), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Aug. 4, 2006) (No. 06-5727);
United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2006); Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 (2d Cir. 2005). The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two cases that will resolve this inter-Circuit split and provide further
guidance to district courts. See United States v. Claiborne, 439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 2006
WL 2187967 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-5618); United States v. Rita, 177 Fed. Appx. 357 (4th Cir. 2006),
cert. granted, 2006 WL 2307774 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-5754).
129. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 (2d Cir. 2005).
130. See AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIM. J. SEC., REPORT ON BOOKER AND RECOMMENDATION, 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 335 (2005) (arguing that advisory guidelines "may not greatly change the status quo"); Bowman, supra
note 64, at 1320 ("[I]t is not yet clear that the 'advisory' guidelines called for by Booker will be so very
different than the mandatory guidelines they replaced."); Carr, supra note 10, at 295 ("[Judicial] discretion is far
from unfettered, as it was before passage of the Sentencing Reform Act. The Supreme Court's ruling that the
Guidelines are advisory makes clear that the Guidelines necessarily play a crucial role in the determination of
individual sentences. Booker neither repeals nor repudiates the Guidelines; it restores, rather, substantial but not
unlimited judicial discretion, while restraining that discretion within the Guideline framework."); Osler, supra
note 10, at 630 ("The shift to advisory guidelines does not mean all former powers of prosecutors evaporate.
Many judges may choose to follow the lead of the first federal District Court judge to rule in the post-Booker
environment [and] give the guidelines 'considerable weight' in sentencing .... So long as judges similarly
follow old practices, prosecutors' powers will be undiminished."); Reitz, supra note 10, at 156 ("Booker has
reduced the mandatory character of the Federal Guidelines, but the degree of change should not be overstated.
The Court has not made the Federal Guidelines toothless, nor has it reinstituted the kind of sentencing discretion
held by district court judges in the days of indeterminate sentencing.... There is reason to think that the post-
Booker Federal Sentencing Guidelines still pack as much wallop as any sentencing guidelines in the country.");
Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 25 ("Booker has loosened the legal reins over sentencing judges somewhat,
but... 'the degree of change should not be overstated."').
131. United States v. McDonald, 461 F.3d 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2006) (vacating sentence roughly fifty
percent below the Guidelines range of 262 to 327 months); United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 304-05
(departing downward from the Guidelines range of twenty-seven to thirty-three months to three years of
probation, including six months of home confinement); United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1005 (departing
from the guideline of 180 months to seventy-eight months). For unpublished dispositions that reach a similar
result, see United States v. Miller, 2005 WL 3271316 (6th Cir. z005) (vacating a sentence based on fourteen-
level downward departure, where court failed to provide adequate explanation); United States v. Brown, 152
Fed. Appx. 55 (2nd Cir. 2005) (imposing consecutive sentences based on judge's "personal attitude"); United
States v. Doe, 128 Fed. Appx. 179 (2d Cir. 2005) (departing upward from the Guidelines to statutory maximum
of ten years for passport fraud where defendant refused to reveal his true name and Presentence Report
recommended a term of six to twelve months imprisonment); see also Carr, supra note 10, at 296 ("[Dleviations
from the norm continue to be subject to close appellate scrutiny."). In McDonald, the dissent noted that post-
Booker the Eighth Circuit has routinely affirmed sentences above the Guidelines range, while reversing most
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court makes a variance, it must articulate its reasons for doing so.'32 Not
surprisingly, perhaps, a district judge's dislike of the Guidelines is insufficient to
withstand reasonableness review on appeal.'33 In short, "it would be a mistake to
think that, after Booker/Fanfan, district judges may return to the sentencing
regime that existed before 1987 and exercise unfettered discretion to select any
sentence within the applicable statutory maximum and minimum.' 34
2. Acculturation of the Courts
Beyond Booker's requirement that the Guidelines be consulted and sentences
reviewed for reasonableness, there is yet another dynamic in play that may limit
the extent to which judges exercise their sentencing discretion: most judges are
acculturated to the Guidelines. Indeed, the majority of federal judges at both the
appellate and district court levels have only known the Guidelines regime. More
than that, a recent survey of federal judges shows that overall, most accept the
Guidelines, however grudgingly, and believe that they achieve several important
goals.
First, federal judges are accustomed to sentencing under the Guidelines.' 35
Most federal judges-indeed, an entire generation of federal judges-have only
sentences below the Guidelines range. 461 F.3d at 960. The court has affirmed sixteen above-Guidelines
sentences, while reversing only one; conversely, it has reversed twenty-five below-Guidelines sentences, while
affirming only four. Id.
132. Jackson, 408 F.3d at 305 (holding that a district court must discuss reasonableness of variance from
Guidelines range); United States v. Mashek, 406 F.3d 1012, 1016 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005) ("When a district court
exercises its discretion to depart or vary from the appropriate guidelines range, it must continue to provide the
reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence."); Mares, 402 F.3d at 519 ("[W]hen the judge elects to give
a non-Guideline sentence, she should carefully articulate the reasons she concludes that the sentence she has
selected is appropriate for that defendant."); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 ("If the court imposes
a sentence outside the guideline range, it should explain its reasons for doing so."); United States v. Crosby, 397
F.3d 103, 116 (2nd Cir. 2005) (noting that Supreme Court in Booker "left unimpaired" provisions of Sentencing
Reform Act that require district court "to state in writing 'with specificity' the reasons for imposing a sentence
outside the calculated Guidelines range"); see also Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance from Above and Beyond, 58
STAN. L. REV. 175, 178-81 (2005) (discussing reasonableness review, under which, there is a strong requirement
to justify sentence that diverges from Guideline range).
133. Haack, 403 F.3d at 1006 (holding it improper for a sentencing judge to downward depart based on
personal dissatisfaction with the Guidelines).
134. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 113; see also Carr, supra note 10, at 295 ("[Wlhile, in all likelihood, all
District Judges welcome the discretion returned to them by Booker, that discretion is far from unfettered, as it
was before passage of the Sentencing Reform Act.").
135. Carr, supra note 10, at 295 ("Most of today's District Judges, having been appointed since 1987,
have known only the Guideline system."); Kim Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-
Blakely Era, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 233, 236 (2005) (noting that most federal judges have only known the world
of the guidelines and are likely to continue to impose guideline sentences); Reitz, supra note 10, at 166 ("[T]he
insistence within the system that the difficult process be performed with exactness must carry psychological
force. Why bother with labyrinthine calculations-and why go to the trouble to enforce their accuracy-if they
can be lightly discarded by sentencing judges? Important officials like federal judges are not accustomed to idle
exercises of great effort and no consequence.").
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known the Guidelines regime. There are approximately 1262 federal judges. 1 6
992 are district judges; 270 are appellate judges. The majority of judges at both
levels became judges after the Guidelines took effect. 615, or 62%, of the district
judges became judges after November 1, 1987; 149, or 55%, of the appellate
judges became judges after November 1, 1987.
Even for judges who took the bench prior to November 1, 1987, the
Guidelines have undoubtedly shaped their views of sentencing, not only in terms
of what the appropriate sentence might be or how severely a crime should be
punished, but also in terms of how they think about sentencing and the interplay
between criminal history and offense conduct, including principles of real
offense sentencing that take into account the defendant's full range of conduct.1
37
Nineteen years is a long time, and for the past nineteen years those judges have
used the Guidelines in imposing or reviewing sentences. Unless the judge has sat
for an unusually long time (thirty-eight years or more), she has spent more time
sentencing under the Guidelines than she did under the prior indeterminate
regime.
Second, not only are judges accustomed to the Guidelines, but they have
increasingly come to accept them. 38 To be sure, judges are not uncritical of the
Guidelines. 39 Nevertheless, in 2002, the Sentencing Commission surveyed
district court and appellate judges for their views on the Guidelines.
Approximately seventy-eight percent of all judges reported that the Guidelines
were at least moderately effective in achieving the purposes of sentencing.
'40
Similarly, judges believed that the Guidelines had been relatively effective in
achieving four of the sentencing goals of the Sentencing Reform Act: "providing
punishment levels that reflect the seriousness of the offense;" "providing
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;" "protecting the public from further
136. These figures come from the database at the Federal Judicial Center and are as of October 4, 2005.
See Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
137. Etienne, supra note 11, at 752 ("Twenty years of Guidelines have changed judges and have forever
altered their sense of what sentences are just and appropriate.").
138. Carr, supra note 10, at 295 ("[Tlhe judicial hostility to the Sentencing Guidelines that marked their
early years is largely a thing of the past.").
139. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at app: C, 2-3. In particular, many
judges remain concerned over the severity of sentences in drug trafficking cases. Id. A plurality of federal
judges also indicated two areas in which the Guidelines were less effective in achieving the purposes of
sentencing: providing defendants with training, medical care, or treatment in the most effective manner, where
rehabilitation was appropriate; and maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors. Id. at 2. For recent examples of judges criticizing the
Guidelines, see United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 1001, 1001. The judge stated at sentencing, "I'm not trying to
say marijuana ought to be legalized or anything like that. I'm just saying, you know, I've given many
outrageous sentences under these guidelines almost all in the drug area." Id. Gertner, supra note 1, at 575-77
(critiquing the Guidelines); Louis F. Oberdorfer, Mandatory Sentencing: One Judge's Perspective-2002, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 11, 16-18 (2003); John S. Martin, Jr., Editorial: Let Judges Do Their Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June
24, 2003, at A31 (calling the Guidelines "a sentencing system that is unnecessarily cruel and rigid").
140. FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING, supra note 4, at 1.
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crimes of the defendant;" and avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among
similarly situated defendants.'4'
While it remains to be seen if the bounds of acculturation loosen over time,
for now at least it appears that federal judges will generally continue to abide by
the Guidelines. At a minimum, the Guidelines serve as a convenient benchmark
against which to evaluate a possible sentence. In many respects, it may also be
easier to resort to the Guidelines than to engage in fully individualized sentencing
on a case-by-case basis. 142 In written remarks, two federal judges have noted the
continuing importance of the Guidelines. Judge James G. Carr has explained that
"[e]ven those whose federal judicial experience predates the Guidelines have
become accustomed ... to the presence of the Guidelines and appear generally to
accept the Guidelines' role in their daily judicial lives.' 43 Judge Nancy Gertner
has similarly observed:
I have absolutely no doubt that, however one characterizes the
Guidelines, their advantages and their flaws, the Guidelines will continue
to play an important part in sentencing. They have shaped the vocabulary
we use to describe sentences and the standards we use to evaluate and
compare cases. Because there were no alternative rules prior to the
Guidelines-no empirical studies linking particular sentences to
particular crime control objectives, no common law of sentencing-and
there have been none since, the Guidelines will continue to have a
critical impact. '4
3. Political Pressure
Yet another factor may temper the extent to which judges decide to depart
from the Guidelines: the fear of creating an appearance of judicial
' 45
overreaching. Federal judges are not politically nave; after all, they were once
nominated by a President and confirmed by the Senate. Most, if not all, judges
141. Id. at 2.
142. Etienne, supra note 11, at 752 ("Good judging is difficult, time-consuming work and the
Guidelines offer a systematic rational alternative that seems less arbitrary than the completely unguided
discretion of the preceding indeterminate sentencing era.") (citing United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984,
987 (E.D. Wis. 2005)). "Sentencing will be harder now than it was a few months ago. District courts cannot just
add up figures and pick a number within a narrow range. Rather, they must consider all of the applicable
factors, listen carefully to defense and government counsel, and sentence the person before them as an
individual." Id.
143. Carr, supra note 10, at 295.
144. Gertner, supra note 1, at 584.
145. Etienne, supra note 11, at 752 ("[Ain advisory guideline system may not lead to changes in
sentencing results because district court judges may be wary of what lawmakers might do if they perceive that
new sentences are wildly inconsistent with what the guidelines would have required. The threat of an adverse
congressional response limiting judicial discretion may be the most significant prosecutorial check on
sentencing."); Reitz, supra note 10, at 167 (discussing how federal judges have "extra-legal incentives" to
follow the Guidelines because of the threat of legislative action).
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are surely aware of the fact that the Attorney General has already decried the
post-Booker "increasing disparity in sentences, and a drift toward lesser
sentences"' 46 and called for "the construction of a minimum guideline system" in
which sentencing courts would be bound by the Guidelines minimum but the
Guidelines maximum would be advisory.'
7
No doubt judges are also aware of the fact that Congress has already
considered a post-Booker "fix" that would convert the Guidelines into a
mandatory minimum sentencing regime.'4 8 In his remedial opinion for the Court,
Justice Breyer seemed to envision legislative action, when he noted, "[o]urs, of
course, is not the last word: The ball now lies in Congress' court.' ' 49 Similarly,
judges have had to respond to the PROTECT Act of 2003,50 which, among other
things, was intended to reduce the number of downward departures under the
Guidelines. 5' In other words, the executive and legislative branches of
government are displeased with Booker and are monitoring what the courts do.
To the extent a judge is considering a departure from the Guidelines based on
Booker, one would expect her to do so cautiously and with an awareness of the
politics of the day and the politicization of crime.11
2
4. Post-Booker Statistics
To date, post-Booker sentencing statistics show that, by and large, courts
continue to sentence defendants within the relevant Guidelines range. Of course,
there is always a risk in trying to predict trends based on preliminary data;
146. Gonzales, supra note 119, at 3.
147. Id. at 5.
148. Defending America's Most Vulnerable: Safe Access to Drug Treatment and Child Protection Act
of 2005, H.R. 1528, 109th Cong. § 12 (2005). For commentary on possible legislative fixes to Booker, see
Letter from Frank 0. Bowman, III, Professor of Law, Ind. Univ. Sch. of Law, to Members of the H. Subcomm.
on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. (Apr. 11, 2005) (critiquing H.R. 1528), reprinted in 17 FED. SENT'G
REP. 311 (2005); Allen & Hastert, supra note 36, at 205 ("If Congress can merely flip the statutory Guidelines
and make all aggravators into mitigators, and there is no obvious reason why not, then Apprendi, like In re
Winship, is largely a case of meaningless formalism."); Reitz, supra note 10, at 167 (noting that Congress could
enact "a matrix of mandatory minimum penalties or some other wholly new sentencing regime that would
eliminate all vestiges of judicial sentencing discretion"); Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 33 (calling
legislation that would impose mandatory minimum sentences across the board the "nuclear option").
149. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005).
150. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT
Act) of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
151. See Reitz, supra note 10, at 167. For critical commentary on the PROTECT Act, see Stephanos
Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004); Miller, supra note 1; Osler, supra note 10; David M. Zlotnick, The War Within the
War on Crime: The Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. Rev. 211 (2004).
152. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 565 (8th Cir. 2005) ("[I]n light of the prevailing political
climate many district judges would have been reluctant to vocalize any criticism of a guideline sentence.");
Reitz, supra note 10, at 167; Gertner, supra note 1, at 576; Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Policy and Penal
Legislation in Recent American Experience, 58 STAN. L. REV. 323, 333 (2005) ("[The] new wave of legislation-
driven shifts in penal policy was a major innovation in the American politics of criminal justice.").
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Booker was decided on January 12, 2005. Nevertheless, from that date to
November 1, 2005, federal courts have imposed 46,470 sentences.'53 61.7% of the
sentences were within the Guidelines range. 1 4 24.2% of the cases involved a
government-sponsored downward departure. 55 1.4% of the cases involved a
sentence above the Guidelines range.' 56 12.8% of the cases involved a non-
government-sponsored sentence below the Guidelines range.117
The rate of sentencing within the Guidelines range--61.7%-appears to be
the lowest reported compliance rate since the Guidelines were enacted, but at the
low end of the historical range when government-sponsored departures are taken
into account. In 2001, 64% of all sentences fell within the Guidelines range; in
2002, that figure was 65%; in 2003, 69.4%; in 2004, 72.2%.'18 The post-Booker
Guidelines compliance rate would likely be somewhat higher but for the
substantial percentage of government-sponsored departures (24.1%), which
exceeds the percentage of such departures in 2003 (22.2%) and 2004 (21.9%)." 9
The compliance rate only tells part of the story. Another important question
to ask is whether Booker has led to larger reductions when judges decide to
sentence below the Guidelines range. So far, at least, the answer to that question
appears to be no. The data is limited, but in 2003 in cases involving non-
government-sponsored downward departures, there was a median decrease of
twelve months or 40% from the minimum Guidelines sentence.' 6 In drug
trafficking cases, there was a sixteen-month or 33.8% median decrease from the
minimum Guidelines sentence. 6' Post-Booker, in cases involving non-
153. SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 119, at 1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. This figure was derived by adding the 1.1% of cases categorized as "otherwise above the
Guideline range" to the .3% of cases for "departure above the Guidelines." Id. Though the report's sum of all
percentages would total 100.1%, this error appears to have resulted from rounding all percentages to the nearest
tenth. See id. Terminology has developed post-Booker to categorize non-Guidelines sentences as either
"departures" or "variances." Id. "Departures" occur when the judge bases the sentence on grounds articulated in
the Guidelines. Id. "Variances" are sentences "otherwise above [or below] the Guidelines range." Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 7. The Sentencing Commission compiles and reports this data on a fiscal year basis. Thus, the
reference to any given year means fiscal year, not calendar year. The data reported for 2004 reflects sentencings
prior to Blakely v. Washington, which was decided on June 24, 2004. SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT,
supra note 119, at 11, n.I. The 1989 compliance rate was 82%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL
REPORT tbl.H (1996). In 1990, it was 83.4%, id.; in 1991, 80.6%, id.; in 1992, 77.4%, id.; in 1993, 75.3%, id.; in
1994, 71.1%, id.; in 1995, 71%, id.; in 1996, 69.6%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 35
(1997). In 1997, it was 67.9%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1998). In 1998, it was
66.3%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 38 (1999). In 1999, it was 64.9%, U.S. SENTENCING
COMM'N, 1999 ANNUAL REPORT 42 (2000). In 2000, it was 64.5%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 ANNUAL
REPORT 42 (2001).
159. SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 119, at 7. The Sentencing Commission does
not report this data for years prior to 2003. Id. at 11 n.5.
160. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.31A
(2004). The Sentencing Commission does not appear to have published earlier data on this point.
161. Id.
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government sponsored departures or variances, the median reduction was twelve
months or around 33%.162 In drug trafficking cases, the median decrease was
seventeen to nineteen months or 26.3% to 27.7% of the Guidelines minimum.
The extent of the decrease in absolute terms is slightly greater post-Booker in
drug trafficking cases, but the percentage decrease from the Guidelines minimum
is actually less than it was in 2003. Thus, to date, it appears that district judges
have been circumspect in exercising their post-Booker discretion. By and large,
they have continued to impose Guidelines sentences, and when they have
sentenced below the Guidelines range, they have made relatively modest
adjustments.'"
5. Laboratory of the States
An examination of what happens in states that have voluntary or advisory
sentencing guidelines may be instructive. At least eighteen states and the District
of Columbia use a sentencing guideline system.6 1 In nine of those states and the
District of Columbia, the guidelines are advisory.'6 Not all states with advisory
guidelines have high compliance rates. In Arkansas, the rate ranged from zero
percent for rape to 20.2% for aggravated robbery and 64.5% for drug
distribution.'67 The compliance rate in many states, however, is quite high.'
68
Virginia had a 79.4% compliance rate in fiscal year 2004.69 Maryland had an
87% compliance rate in 2001 and 80% in 2002.17 Utah's compliance rate was
79% for sex offenses and 86% for all other offenses.
7
'
Thus, developments at the state level may serve as a useful point of
comparison for what may happen federally in the post-Booker world. While more
study in this area would be helpful-in particular an examination of the
similarities and differences between systems used in the states and the federal
system-there is no reason to conclude that advisory guidelines inevitably lead to
low compliance rates.'17 That, coupled with the emerging reasonableness standard
of review, the acculturation of judges, and political pressure on the courts, may
162. SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 119, at 22.
163. Id. at 21-22.
164. Moreover, according to a recent report of the United States Sentencing Commission, "[tihe average
sentence length after Booker has increased." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING vii (2006) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
165. Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1195 (2005).
166. Hunt & Connelly, supra note 135, at 233.
167. Id. at 236.
168. Id.; see also Frase, supra note 165, at 1198 ("'[C]ompliance rates' in some voluntary guidelines
jurisdictions are quite high.").
169. Hunt & Connelly, supra note 135, at 236.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. ("[L]ow compliance rates do not seem intrinsic to advisory guidelines states.").
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mean that the federal compliance rate remains in the historical range, though,
perhaps, on the low side. Of course, prosecutors will continue to possess the
discretion to influence the compliance rate. Now, as before Booker, they possess
the power to file substantial assistance motions,'73 create early disposition (or
"fast track") programs,74 or stipulate to sentences below the Guidelines range.171
D. Bargain Theory
While district judges have continued to impose Guidelines sentences in most
cases, the fact remains that they now have more latitude to impose a non-
Guidelines sentence. This discretion creates uncertainty on a case-by-case basis,
greater uncertainty than under the Guidelines pre-Booker, when the likely
sentence was usually fairly easy to predict. Uncertainty may be viewed as an
opportunity for one party in a negotiation, but as a risk to another. Even more so
than in the past, rational parties will attempt to predict the likely sentence of the
judge. Much will depend upon the parties' read of the sentencing proclivities of
the judge.
Bargain theory helps inform the analysis of how the uncertainty created by
Booker will influence prosecutorial discretion. A considerable body of
scholarship has explored bargain theory in a criminal context.' 76 Recent
scholarship has often focused on distortions in the bargaining process that create
inefficiencies and impede a defendant's ability to evaluate the terms of an offer
or to reach an optimal resolution. 7 7 Nevertheless, a starting point for bargain
theory analysis is that parties attempt to predict the likely outcome of trial,
including the probability of conviction and the likely sentence to be imposed.
"[P]arties bargain over the allocation of criminal punishment in order to reassign
and thereby reduce the risks of an uncertain future . . ,,17 A critical question
173. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2005).
174. Id. § 5K3.1 (2005).
175. FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(c)(1)(C).
176. For a small sampling of such scholarship, see Wright, supra note 109; William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Plea
Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471 (1993); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1935 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1975 (1992); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14
J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971).
177. See Wright, supra note 109, at 86 ("[Tlhe combination of charging and sentencing options gave
federal prosecutors the power to distort trial outcomes."); Stuntz, supra note 176, at 2548 ("[1]n a variety of
ways and for a variety of reasons, criminal settlements do not efficiently internalize the law."); Bibas, supra
note 176, at 2469-527 (describing institutional and human distortions on the "shadow-of-trial model of plea
bargaining").
178. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 176, at 1935.
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becomes how risk averse the parties are. The more likely "[a] settlement is ... to
take place.., the greater the defendant's aversion to risk." '79
Here, the initial post-Booker statistics are telling. In .7% of the cases the
judge sentenced above the Guidelines range and specifically cited Booker as a
basis for the increase.8 In 7.1% of the cases, the judge cited Booker and
sentenced below the Guidelines range.'' Based on this data, it appears that a
judge is roughly ten times more likely to sentence downward than upward with
her post-Booker discretion.
As a result, in many cases prosecutors will hold fewer cards than they did
before Booker when the judge had less discretion to sentence outside the
Guidelines range. Yet the fact remains that in at least some non-Guidelines cases,
the judge may go upward, not downward. After Booker, the rate of above-range
sentences has doubled.'82 In cases in which a defendant fears an above-range
sentence or is particularly risk-averse, the prosecutor may gain increased
leverage, for the defendant, theoretically, could receive a sentence up to the
statutory maximum. A plea agreement might well reduce this risk.
Indeed, in this post-Booker world, one would expect to see more attempts by
the parties to contract about the uncertainty created by the risk of judicial
departures or variances, either upwards or downwards. The parties could do this
by entering into an agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
1 l(c)(1)(C), whereupon they stipulate to an agreed upon sentence that the court
cannot modify.8 3 Post-Booker, preliminary data indicates that the government
stipulated to a sentence outside the Guidelines range in 3% of the cases.' 1 It will
be interesting and instructive to see if this figure increases over time. If so, it
could become a significant source of sentencing disparity. 8
IV. CONCLUSION
To a limited extent, Booker has reduced prosecutorial discretion. Now that
the Guidelines are advisory, prosecutors have less control over a defendant's
sentence. Prosecutors retain great power, however, and there are important limits
179. Landes, supra note 176, at 99; see also Easterbrook, supra note 176, at 1975 ("[R]isk-averse
persons prefer a certain but small punishment to a chancy but large one.").
180. SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 119, at 1. This figure is derived by adding the
percentages of cases in which the court sentenced "[albove the [riange with Bookerl 8 U.S.C. § 3553," or .6%,
and the cases in which the court made an "[ulpward departure with BookerI8 U.S.C. § 3553," or .1%, for a
total of .7%. Id.
181. Id. This figure is derived by adding the percentages of cases in which the court made a
"[d]ownward [d]eparture with Booker/I18 U.S.C. § 3553," or 1.0%, and the cases in which the court sentenced
"[blelow the [riange with Booker/18 U.S.C. § 3553," or 6.1%, for a total of 7.1%. Id.
182. FINAL REPORT, supra note 164, at vii.
183. FED. R. CRIM. P. lI(c)(1)(C).
184. SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT, supra note 119, at 1.
185. The Ashcroft Memorandum should limit Rule I l(c)(l)(C) plea agreements to non-Guideline
sentences, but, as noted previously, there are significant exceptions to the policy. In any event, it does not
preclude an agreement to a Guidelines sentence.
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on Booker's reach. First, Booker only affects prosecutorial discretion under the
Guidelines. All other aspects of prosecutorial discretion are left untouched.
Second, since the Guidelines were first enacted, Congress has passed a slew of
statutes that impose mandatory-minimum penalties. These statutes remain; their
constitutionality is not in question. Independently of the Guidelines, they provide
prosecutors with a significant amount of leverage, particularly with respect to
charging decisions and in plea bargaining.
Third, sentencing courts are likely to be circumspect in using their new-
found freedom. District courts must still consult the Guidelines, and the Courts of
Appeals have begun to give content to the reasonableness standard of review.
While the law is emerging, it appears that a Guidelines sentence is a safe harbor
of sorts and will generally be held reasonable. Moreover, judges may be
acculturated to the Guidelines. Most judges have only known the Guidelines
regime. They are also aware of the intense scrutiny, both executive and
congressional, that they are under and the "nuclear option" of across-the-board
mandatory minimums being considered. '8 6 Indeed, preliminary data confirms that
sentencing courts have hardly reveled in exercising their post-Booker discretion.
By and large, most sentences fall within the relevant Guidelines sentencing
range.
Bargain theory provides one more reason why Booker's reach may be limited
in some cases. Although a judge may use her discretion to depart downward from
the relevant Guidelines sentencing range, it is also possible that she will depart
upward. Booker has not proven to be a one-way ratchet. Even more so than
before Booker, parties must evaluate a sentencing judge's predilections.
Uncertainty enhances risk and risk may create more pressure to enter into a plea
agreement. Prosecutorial discretion may be increased on an ad hoc basis in a
post-Booker world, for a defendant may fear receiving a sentence at the statutory
maximum.
The wild card in all of this post-Booker analysis is what Congress will do
now that the Guidelines are advisory. One noted commentator has predicted that
Booker's result is "politically unsustainable."' 87 Indeed, as Justice Breyer
observed in his remedial opinion, "[t]he National Legislature is equipped to
devise and install, long-term, the sentencing system, compatible with the
Constitution, that Congress judges best for the federal system of justice."'88
Whatever legislative action may follow should not be driven by concern for the
post-Booker loss of prosecutorial discretion. Otherwise, the Guidelines and
Booker may give rise to the most unwarranted and ironic disparity of all: concern
for federal prosecutors and executive power, rather than the overall fairness of
the criminal justice system and sound sentencing policy.
186. Weisberg & Miller, supra note 1, at 33 (describing the proposed legislative fix of across-the-board
mandatory minimum penalties as the "nuclear option").
187. Bowman, supra note 1, at 257.
188. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 265 (2005).

